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Additional info for Antitrust Law and Economics, Volume 21
Buyers can enhance their bargaining leverage, therefore, by amalgamating their orders. Scherer and Ross state (p. 528): [O]ligopolists are prone to cut prices in order to land an unusually large order, especially when they have excess capacity. Large buyers can exploit this weakness by concentrating their orders into big lumps, dangling the temptation before each seller, and encouraging a break from the established price structure. As Scherer and Ross suggest, a buyer’s bargaining strength also depends on the amount of excess capacity its suppliers face.
If those consumers did not prefer the offerings of the favored firms, they would not have switched. The market appears to have ruled, therefore, that an expansion of the favored firms and a contraction of the disfavored firms is what consumers wanted. This conclusion may not be warranted, however, because the consumers who had patronized the disfavored firms may have faced a collective-action problem – a market failure that casts doubt on the market solution. Suppose that each of these consumers was attracted by the reduced prices at the favored firms, but also wanted to preserve the option of shopping at the disfavored firms.
92 These cases are not definitive, though, because they do not address whether cost savings may excuse higher prices. In contrast, several opinions appear to support Bork’s view of consumer welfare. 94 Moreover, two other cases indicate that a plaintiff must show allocative inefficiency or its equivalent – an output restriction. 95 It is not clear how to interpret the opinions that simply describe the purpose of the antitrust laws as “consumer welfare,” without elaboration. It could be argued that these decisions subscribe to Bork’s view because the first time the Supreme Court indicated that “consumer welfare” was the ultimate goal of antitrust law, it relied on Bork’s book.