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The AAF spokesmen shared a widespread view that the mere skeleton forces and mobilization base of the interwar years had failed to deter the Axis powers. As Secretary of State James F. ”18 The joint chiefs certainly agreed that cooperation with the British and the Soviets was the best means of securing the peace, but they realized that diplomacy could falter. , on Nov 15, 1945, RG 165, Decimal 320 (Sep-Dec 1946), MMB, NA. Zbid. Ltr, James F. Byrnes, Sec State, to R. P. Patterson, Sec War, Nov 29, 1945, with encl: Answers to Questions Contained in the Memorandum Dated Nov 1, 1945 From the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, in FRUS, 1946, Vol I, p 1132.

Molotov, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, “If any nation menaced peace.. ”23 This concept presupposed the maintenance of military forces, especially at sea and in the air, and was thus consistent with the lessons that American military leaders had drawn from their experience of the war. S. strategic thinking. In the past, advocates of peacetime military strength had spoken of “preparedness,” which generally meant maintaining a regular army and reserves as a nucleus around which the manpower pool would be mobilized.

41 39 Curtis E. LeMay, et al, “The Perceptions of Three Makers of Air Power History,” in Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart, eds, Air Power and Warfare. Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, Oct 18-20, 1978JWashington: AFCHO, 19791, pp 197-198. Craven & Cate, AAF, Vol I: Plans & Early Operations, pp 99-100, 135-139. , pp 92-100, 177-185, 249. 20 Air Power and Airmen The Victory Program marked a major stage in the spectacular industrial mobilization of the United States in the Second World War.